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1 Introduction
Financing elections and procuring goods are universal features of most governments.
Public procurement is an economically relevant outcome, accounting for up to 25 per
cent of the worldwide GDP (World Bank, 2017). In addition, most countries allow
corporate contributions to finance political campaigns, as only 46 of 180 countries ban
corporate contributions to electoral campaigns or political candidates (IDEA, 2020).
Therefore, understanding whether campaign financing regulations and fiscal policy
rules affect procurement outcomes is a very relevant question from a public policy
perspective.
The procurement process is not always evenly distributed across time within the
fiscal year calendar. Popular terms like March Madness, December Fever, and Spring
Sale have become popular terms to describe periods when the government demand
is peaking. More recently, academic studies have documented pronounced spikes in
public spending at the end of a fiscal year in Canada (Hurley et al., 2014), United States
(Liebman and Mahoney, 2017), Germany (Fitzenberger et al., 2016) and the United
Kingdom and Northern Ireland (Baumann, 2019). Moreover, using a sample of OECD
countries, Eichenauer (2020) finds that 30% of the public spending happens in the last
quarter of a fiscal year. A priori, such spikes in the volume of public procurement may
affect the marginal costs and benefits of public organizations and firms participating
in the procurement process and, in turn, change procurement outcomes and welfare.
While extensive literature has documented that corporate contributions increase
the number of procurement contracts won by contributing firms (Baltrunaite, 2019;
Boas et al., 2014; Titl and Geys, 2019), whether and how such influence depends on in-
stitutional factors such as fiscal policy regulation is so far an open question. Moreover,
the extent and consequences of the end of the year spending in developing countries
remain open questions to our knowledge. Using Brazil as a laboratory, we answer
three questions to help to fill such literature gaps:
• How extensive is the incidence of end-of-the-year spending in Brazil?
• Do firms that contribute to electoral campaigns win more procurement contracts?
• How do the spikes of end-of-the-year spending affect the returns of campaign
contribution of firms?
Brazil is an ideal laboratory to answer these three research questions. First, cor-
porate contributions were the primary source of campaign revenue in Brazil between
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2007 and 2014, covering around 75% of campaign spending in national elections (Cav-
gias and Granella, 2020). Second, previous studies have found evidence for positive re-
turns of campaign contribution in Brazil (Boas et al., 2014; Arvate et al., 2018; Claessens
et al., 2008). Third, there are expiring budgets in Brazil (Lei nº 4.320 64), which we
show to cause spikes at the end of the year in the results section. Finally, Brazil offers
granular data about the universe of purchase acts from the federal government and
identified data with Brazil’s universe of political contributions.
Expiring budgets may cause spikes at the end-of-the-year spending for different
reasons. Recent contributions argue that precautionary savings (Liebman and Ma-
honey, 2017) and procrastination (Baumann, 2019) are the main reasons behind the
observed spikes in public spending at the end of the year. In the Brazilian context, we
speculate that precautionary saving by the federal government caused by tax revenue
uncertainty and primary surplus targets is a plausible explanation behind the peaks
in procurement activity at the last quarter of the fiscal year.
Expiring budgets may increase the return of political connections by making the
opportunity cost of exhausting the budget close to zero for public officials. Hence,
they create a window of opportunity for public officials to allocate contracts to firms
in exchange for campaign donations at a lower marginal cost for the public adminis-
tration. Contributing firms may also perceive such a window of opportunity for quid
pro quo exchanges and concentrate their procurement activities during demand peaks.
Besides, decreases in auditing capacity and media attention at the end of the year may
facilitate political favouring.
We provide three complementary pieces of evidence. First, we collapse data about
the universe of procurement tenders by the Brazilian federal government to describe
the distribution of the number of purchase acts across quarters. Second, we merge
such data with information about the universe of national campaign contributions to
estimate returns of political connections in Brazil using OLS regressions with fixed
effects. Third, we use such fixed-effect models to estimate the distribution of the re-
turn of campaign contributions across peak and non-peak quarters. We document
three main findings. First, we find that the number of purchase acts monotonically
increases across the year and peaks at the last quarter of the fiscal year. +Second,
we show that contributing firms win between 11.6 to 13.4% more public tenders than
non-contributing ones. Third, we find that the return of contributing firms is 2.65 p.p.
more extensive in the last quarter of the fiscal year. Hence, the return of campaign
contributions increases 24.6 per cent in the fourth quarter.
We take two main steps to probe the robustness of our results. First, we show
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that the increase in the return of contributions at the last quarter remains stable when
estimated using very stringent specifications (with firm, firm-year, sector-quarter, and
location-quarter fixed effects), which reduces the likelihood of omitted variable biases.
Second, we show that results remain qualitatively similar when using a broader mea-
sure of political connections and outcomes measuring the allocation of contracts at the
extensive margin.
Our paper is related to three strands of literature. First, we communicate with re-
cent literature studying the consequences of end-of-the-year spending (Liebman and
Mahoney, 2017; Fitzenberger et al., 2016; Klymak and Baumann, 2021). While such
literature investigates the incidence of end-of-year spending in OECD countries, it is
silent about the extent of such phenom in developing countries. To our knowledge,
we provide the first time to find evidence for heightened year-end spending in a de-
veloping nation, which we show to have similar magnitudes to the ones estimated
in OEDC countries 1. While previous studies have focused on how end-of-the-year
spending affects prices (Klymak and Baumann, 2021), quality of the purchased goods
(Liebman and Mahoney, 2017), or effectiveness of public services (Fitzenberger et al.,
2016), we find evidence for a nonobvious and yet unexplored relationship between
end-of-the-year spending and political favouritism.
Second, we communicate with the extensive literature about the returns of political
connections (Tahoun, 2014; Goldman et al., 2013; McMenamin, 2013; Szakonyi, 2020;
Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001; Knight, 2006). Recent research within this literature has
shown that political campaign contribution can be beneficial for firms (Boas et al., 2014;
Baltrunaite, 2019; Titl and Geys, 2019; Claessens et al., 2008; Carvalho, 2014; Arvate
et al., 2018; Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Fowler et al., 2020). Despite extensive evidence
that firms benefit from political connections, this literature is still relatively silent about
which institutional factors influence the return from connections. We contribute to this
literature by showing that budgeting rules inflate the benefits received by corporate
campaign contributors in Brazil.
Finally, we contribute to the literature investigating the empirical determinants of
public procurement outcomes. Most of this literature has focused on the role of the
supply side of procurement - i.e., the influence of firms’ and markets’ characteristics
on procurement outcomes, paying less attention to the demand side of public procure-
ment - i.e., how public organization characteristics’ influence procurement outcomes.
Recent papers started to investigate the role of demand factors such as competition
1The magnitude of the end-of-the-year spikes in Brazil is very similar to the OECD spikes (Fitzen-
berger et al., 2016).
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(McAfee and McMillan, 1989; Vagstad, 1995; Bajari and Tadelis, 2001), price policy
(Bandiera et al., 2009), electronic procurement (Lewis-Faupel et al., 2016), type of con-
tracts (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) or preferences for firms with certain characteristics like
reputation and discretion (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Coviello and Mariniello, 2014).
Another contribution of this paper is that we add a new aspect on the demand side of
public procurement, namely the importance of the budget calendar.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Electoral campaign financing in Brazil
Brazil is a presidential democracy with a bicameral congress. The election cycle lasts
for four years in national and local elections, but local elections happen two years af-
ter the national ones. Members of the executive power (i.e., president, governors, and
mayors) may reelect only once. In contrast, members of the legislative power (i.e.,
senators, deputies, and city councillors) face no reelection constraints, creating room
for repeated interaction with campaign sponsors. Two-round majoritarian elections
define the executive positions, except in cities with fewer than 200 thousand inhabi-
tants, where runoffs are not allowed. An open-list proportional representation system
defines the legislative positions.
The Brazilian Supreme Court banned corporate contributions to political campaigns
in September of 2015 amid a massive corruption scandal, known as Lava Fato, involv-
ing allocating overpriced contracts from Brazil’s state-own oil company to corporate
contributors. In an attempt to prevent the corporate ban, congress passed a law en-
forcing campaign spending limits in 2015, which has been shown to increase political
competition in Brazil (Avis et al., 2017). Due to both reforms, we focus our analysis on
the years between 2006 and 2014, the pre-reform years.
Even after such reforms, campaign contributions are practically unlimited in Brazil.
Before the corporate ban of 2015, corporations could donate 2% of their gross annual
revenues. Besides, individuals can still contribute up to 10% of their annual gross
personal income. Hence, contribution limits are very generous, especially for wealthy
donors.
Any form of campaign contribution can only occur during the campaign period,
which starts 90 days before the elections and must be publicized a few days after be-
ing completed. The contribution data is published online on the electoral authority’s
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website, creating a suitable environment for high-quality empirical investigations.
The Brazilian political system is prone to expensive campaigns. First, the open list
system with proportional elections promotes competition between candidates within
the same coalition, increasing the need for individual campaign spending. Second, the
party system is weak and disorganized (Bourdoukan, 2010; Samuels, 2001). The miss-
ing support, logistically and financially, of well-organized party structures implicates
that candidates are urged to bear the campaign costs by their own in order to complete
a successful candidacy. Due to the weak party structures political influence is rarely
policy-induced and ideological (i.e. the ”pro-guns” lobby in the U.S.). In Brazil, corpo-
rations expect governmental services and benefits in exchange for their campaign con-
tributions (Samuels, 2001), since political influence is mainly service-induced. Third,
political contributions are serious investment decisions by corporations to find their
way to influence politics since business associations are weakly organized (Schneider
et al., 2004; Schneider, 2010). These organization are incapable to represent business
interests in politics. Thus, a different channel of political influence, namely campaign
contributions, evolved.
Not surprisingly, electoral campaigns are expensive in Brazil. In 2014, campaign
expenses of the national elections corresponded to approximately 0.15% of the GDP
(Cavgias and Granella, 2020). Costs are exceptionally high in legislative elections, as
the average campaign cost for electing a congress member was more than R$ 1.4 mil-
lion in 2014. In comparative terms, the cost per vote in Brazil ($23) is higher than in
the United States ($20) (Pearson and Trevisani, 2017).
Contribution by private influence groups financed such expensive political cam-
paigns in Brazil. Between the 2006 and 2014 elections, corporate contributions funded
approximately 75% of the total campaign expenses in national elections while they
corresponded for nearly 50% of the total campaign expenses local elections. In con-
trast, the share of personal contributions over total campaign revenues is modest in
national (14%) and local (38%) elections (Cavgias and Granella, 2020).
The influence of the most prominent influence groups is disproportional in Brazil.
For instance, the highest 5% of contributions in national elections correspond to three-
quarters of the total contributions. The disproportional influence of most extensive
contributions is at odds with countries like the US, Canada and Germany, where most
of the campaign revenue comes from small contributions (Bouton et al., 2018).
Brazil is a context where corporate contributions are likely buying influence in allo-
cating government resources. Boas et al. (2014) find evidence that contributing firms
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obtain more government than non-contributing ones, in magnitude correspond to 14
to 39 times the average contribution. Likewise, Cavgias and Granella (2020) show that
contributing firms get between 20 to 25 per cent more government contracts. Besides,
contributing firms also obtain more subsided credit from the Brazilian development
bank (BNDES) (Claessens et al., 2008; Lazzarini et al., 2015).
2.2 Public procurement in Brazil
Public procurement consumes a relatively large fraction of public resources world-
wide. For instance, it consumed 4.2 trillion euros among the OECD in 2013, around
12% of the GDP and one-third of governmental expenditure (OECD, 2016). The pic-
ture is not different in Brazil, where public procurement accounted for about 9% of the
GDP in 2008 (OECD, 2012).
The Public Procurement Act (Law 8666 of 1993) regulates the allocation of pub-
lic contracts to firms in Brazil. The law establishes two main guidelines for public
procurement. First, except for tenders of small values and specific cases, goods and
services should be procured by competitive price-auctions open to any supplier with-
out legal impediments. Second, most goods and services should be procured in non-
presential electronic auction auctions. Except for large infrastructure projects, stan-
dardized goods and services have auctions using the online platform ComprasNet,
which constitutes the data set used in this paper. ComprasNet is the most relevant tool
to procure standardized goods, comprising almost half 2 of all federal government
tenders by the year 2010 (Szerman, 2012).
The fiscal year coincides with the calendar year in Brazil. Hence, the fiscal year
starts in January and ends in December. According to the Brazilian law, textitLei nº
4.320 64, budgets of public organizations expire at the end of the fiscal year. As a
consequence, unspent budgets get lead back to the budget distributor at the end of the
fiscal year.
2Szerman (2012) finds that around 46% of the total number of tenders were procured in ComprasNet.
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3 Theory
3.1 Theories of end-of-the-year spending
Despite being observed in most developed countries (Eichenauer, 2020), there is still
no consensus about which mechanisms explain the spikes in public spending at the
end of the fiscal year. By now, the literature proposes two main explanations for
such phenom: precautionary saving (Liebman and Mahoney, 2017) and procrastina-
tion (Baumann, 2019).
Liebman and Mahoney (2017) develop a two-period principal-agent model where
the principal is the Congress, who determines the budget, and the agent is a govern-
ment agency, who implements the budget. The fiscal year has two periods: 1 (start of
the fiscal year) and 2 (end of the fiscal year). To mirror the US budgeting process, the
model assumes there are expiring budgets, meaning that the part of the budget not
consumed by the last day of the fiscal year returns to Congress. As the agent receives
no utility if the budget returns to Congress, she will exhaust all remaining budget at
the end of the fiscal year.
Public spending has decreasing marginal returns in the production of public goods
in both periods. Besides, there is uncertainty about the marginal productivity of the
public spending in both periods, which can be caused either by a demand-side (e.g.,
pandemic, natural disaster) or supply-side shock (e.g., unexpected increase in the price
of public goods). The main result of the model states that if the utility of the agent
allows for precautionary saving, she will spend more in the second period than in the
first one, which captures the spikes of public spending at the end of the fiscal year
observed in the data.
In the Brazilian context, precautionary saving is a plausible mechanism behind the
pronounced end of the year spending. In contrast to Liebman and Mahoney (2017),
the source of precautionary saving is likely caused by the national government’s fiscal
constraints instead of the public organizations individually. As Brazil has high internal
debt, the federal administration subject itself to primary surplus targets to enforce a
sustainable debt trajectory and push interest rates down. Despite the primary surplus
targets, the budget allocation happens when tax revenue is still uncertain. Given the
need to enforce such targets, the national government has mechanisms to suspend
public spending within a fiscal year while tax revenue remains uncertain and cutting
spending when primary surplus targets become unfeasible.
By arguing that precautionary saving is an argument for expending the entire bud-
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get within a fiscal year but not at its final months, Baumann (2019) develops a different
approach to understand the existence of year-end spikes, namely procrastination. Sim-
ilarly to Liebman and Mahoney (2017), there are two periods, and decreasing marginal
returns on the production of public goods. Public spending in each period depends
on effort from public officials, which causes disutility to them. The public official’s
payoff depends on a performance evaluation happening at the end of the year, which
depends on the production of the public good in both periods. The main results of
the model state that if public officials discount effort over time, they will spend more
and exert more effort in the second period than in the first one. In other words, the
model can capture both spikes of public spending at the end of the fiscal year and pro-
crastination, which is consistent with recent evidence from patent offices in the United
States (Frakes and Wasserman, 2020).
There is convincing evidence that end-of-year spending causes welfare losses. Us-
ing procurement data from Ukraine, (Klymak and Baumann, 2021) show that prices
are 2.5% higher at the end of the year, which should translate into considerable wel-
fare losses because public procurement consumes a high share of the GDP. Besides,
Liebman and Mahoney (2017) find that end-of-the-year spending causes low-quality
spending in the context of IT projects of US federal agencies and low-quality services
in the context of training programs for unemployed people Fitzenberger et al. (2016).
3.2 Mechanisms
There are static and dynamic incentives that make public officials consume all the
budget before it expires. Since the population usually prefer a higher consumption of
public goods, exhausting the budget increases the utility of mission- and politically-
oriented bureaucrats. Besides, public officials also face dynamic incentives. First, not
consuming all the budget may signal bureaucratic incompetence, which damage the
career progression of public officials. Second the ratchet effect - i.e., the inertia in the
budgeting process - may force bureaucrats to exhaust the budget within a fiscal year
to prevent losing resources in the next year. Altogether, such static and dynamic forces
make the opportunity cost of the public spending near-zero or, in some cases, negative
at the end of the fiscal year.
If bureaucrats are politically oriented, several mechanisms may explain why ex-
piring budgets may increase the return of political connections at the end of the fiscal
year. First, the near-zero opportunity cost of public spending opens the possibility for
pleasing political groups at a low marginal cost for the public administration. Sec-
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ond, the spike in public contracts may prevent auditing mechanisms from identifying
suspect contracts, facilitating political allocation from politically oriented bureaucrats.
Third, if the fiscal year expires during holidays, a decrease in public attention to the
budgeting process near the holidays may facilitate favouritism. Forth, public officials
may purposely procrastinate the date of some tenders to the end of the fiscal year
when public attention and audit mechanisms are weaker. Fifth, bureaucrats may have
more discretion on the type of public spending procured at the end of the fiscal year
(e.g., low priority items).
4 Data
4.1 Data Source
We use three primary data sources in our analysis. First, we use data from the Com-
prasNet system shared by the Conselho Administrativo de Defasa Econômica (CADE), the
Brazilian antitrust authority.3 ComprasNet data includes detailed information about
the universe of federal government purchase acts. Second, we use data from the Tri-
bunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), the Brazilian electoral authority, with detailed infor-
mation about the universe of campaign contributions to federal (2006, 2010, 2014) and
local elections (2004, 2008, 2012). Third, we use data from the CNPJ Aberto, the Brazil-
ian national registry of firms, with information about the universe of formal sector
firms.
4.2 Variables
We compute three main sets of variables. First, using ComprasNet data, we compute
our outcome variables: the number of procurement tenders won and an indicator for
winning a tender for each firm-year-quarter. Second, we compute our treatment vari-
ables using TSE data: indicators equal to one when a firm made a corporate contribu-
tion in any (national) election held during our analysis period. We purposely construct
time-invariant treatment to capture exchanges of (i) present campaign contributions
for promised future contractual benefits and (ii) promises of future campaign contri-
butions for present contractual benefits. Third, using CNPJ Aberto data, we compute
location (region and municipality) and industry (2 and 5 digits) fixed effects based on
3We thank Bruno Duarte Garcia and Felipe Leitão Valadares Roquete for gently sharing a complete
version of the SIASG Comprasnet Data Warehouse.
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information about the firm headquarter.
4.3 Data Sample
Between 2007 and 2014, the ComprasNet system procured 18.848.737 purchase acts in-
volving 91 public organizations (layer 1). We collapse the universe of purchase acts
between 2007 and 2014 at the year-quarter level to describe the intensity of end of year
spending in Brazil. Despite not being uniformly distributed within the fiscal year, the
number of purchase acts is relatively stable across fiscal years in our sample.
We make two main steps to select the firms used to estimate the return of political
connections. First, we restrict the analysis to a set of potential government suppliers -
i.e., firms who participated in any procurement auction between 2004 and 2018. Sec-
ond, to have a perfectly balanced panel, we exclude firms that shut down between
2004 and 2014. By taking these two steps, we can focus on a subsample more relevant
for fiscal policy studies without working with a vast dataset with a tiny treatment
group (less than 1% of the firms).
There are 97.522 firms in the sample of potential government suppliers. In addition,
7.894 firms contributed to a national election and 13.405 to national or local elections.
Hence, our treatment group corresponds to around 8 to 14 per cent of the sample. We
compute a firm-year-quarter level dataset for the 97.522 firms for four quarters per
year for eight years (2007 to 2014), accounting for 3.120.704 observations.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents a summary of the outcome, treatment and control variables in our
data set. Panel A of Table 1 shows the outcome variables. On average, 14.4 per cent
of the firms won at least one tender. Panel B demonstrates that 8.1 per cent of the
firms contributed to a national electoral campaign while 13.7 per cent them to a na-
tional or regional electoral campaign. In Panel C, we show the distribution of the
firms according to their economic sector. In order, the three main economic sectors
participating in ComprasNet auctions are Trade (52%), Services (21.4%), and Low-tech
manufacturing (11.9%), the leading suppliers of off-the-shelf goods to the national gov-
ernment. Finally, panel D reports statistics about the geographical distribution of the
corporations. Most ComprasNet suppliers have headquarters in the South-east (42.6%)
and South (25.3%) regions, Brazil’s more relevant economic regions.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Outcome Variables
Log(1+ number of tenders won) 0.254 0.753 0 9.307
Dummy = 1, if tender won 0.144 0.351 0 1
Panel B: Treatmen Variables
Contribution to national election 0.081 0.273 0 1
Contribution to national and local election 0.137 0.344 0 1
Panel C: Economic Sector
Agriculture 0.006 0.079 0 1
Low-Tech Manufacturing 0.119 0.323 0 1
High-Tech Manufacturing 0.047 0.211 0 1
Construction 0.051 0.219 0 1
Trade 0.523 0.499 0 1
Transport/ Utilities/ Communication 0.04 0.197 0 1
Services 0.214 0.41 0 1
Panel D: Geographical Region
North 0.067 0.25 0 1
North-East 0.175 0.38 0 1
South-East 0.426 0.495 0 1
South 0.253 0.435 0 1
Central-West 0.079 0.27 0 1
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of our dataset. Panel A shows the outcome
variables which were obtained from the ComprasNet system by the Brazilian antitrust au-
thority (CADE). Panel B entails the treatment variables of contribution which we obtained
from the the Brazilian electoral authority (TSE). Panel C and Panel D display information
about the economic sector of the firms on a macro-sector level and the geographical loca-
tion of the firms on a regional level. This information was obtained by the Brazilian national
registry of firms (CNPJ Alberto).
5 Methodology
5.1 End-of-the-year spending
We start by testing the economic hypothesis that the frequency of procurement tenders
peaks in the last quarter of the year. Then, we proceed in two steps. First, we describe
the aggregate number of purchase acts distribution across the four quarters of the year.
Second, we estimate the following regression model to provide an statistical test for
such economic hypothesis:
log(1 + num tendersy,q,o,g) = αy + αo + αg + ∑
k 6=1
δk · 1(q = k) + εy,q,o,g (1)
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where log(1 + num tendersy,q,o,g) measures the log number of tenders in quarter q in a
year y made by public organization o buying good g plus one. 1(q = k) is an indicator
variable equal to one when q = k ∈ {2, 3, 4}. αy, αq, αo, and , αg capture, respectively,
year, quarter, public organization and good fixed effects. We use the first quarter as
the reference period and robust standard errors.
By documenting increasing coefficients across quarters (i.e., δ̂4 > δ̂3 > δ̂2 > δ̂1 = 0),
we show that there are spikes at the end of the fiscal year. Besides, we show that such a
pattern holds when comparing purchase acts within the same year, done by the same
organization, and buying the same type of good.
5.2 Returns of campaign contribution
After describing the aggregate frequency of procurement tenders across quarters, we
test the economic hypothesis that the contributing firms win more than non-contributing
ones. In other words, we measure the return of campaign contributions in terms of the
numbers of procurement tenders won by firms. To estimate the return of campaign
contributions, we estimate the following regression model
log(1 + num tenders f ,q,y) = αsector( f ),q,y + αcity( f ),q,y + γcontributing f + ε f ,q,y (2)
where log(1+ num tenders f ,q,y) measures the log number of tenders won by a firm
f in a quarter q in a year y plus one. αsector( f ) and αcity( f ) capture, respectively, firm
economic sector and firm location (headquarter) fixed effects. We cluster standard er-
rors at the firm level. Our coefficient of interest γ measures, in percentage points,
how much more procurement tenders contributing firms win concerning the non-
contributing ones. As we estimate a simple difference of outcome averages, we do not
claim a causal interpretation for γ. Instead, we argue that a γ with a high magnitude
is suggestive of a context where corporate contributions buy influence, as suggested
by their importance as a source of campaign revenue.
5.3 Effect of the peak quarter on the return of campaign contribu-
tions
We investigate if the return of campaign contributions increased when the demand
peaks at the last quarter of the fiscal year by estimating an OLS model with fixed
effects. We estimate by comparing the log-number of procurement tenders won by
contributing and non-contributing firms across peak and non-peak quarters restricting
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the comparison to firms in the same economic sectors and geographical location. More
precisely, we estimate the following regression model
log(1 + num tenders f ,q,y) = α f + αq,y + β1contributing f + β2 · peakq
+β3contributing f · peakq + ε f ,q,y
(3)
where log(1 + num tenders f ,q,y) measures the log number of tenders won by a firm f
in a quarter q in a year y plus one. α f and αq,y capture, respectively, firm fixed effects
and year-quarter fixed effects. contributing f is a dummy variable and equals one if a
firm has contributed to a political campaign. Likewise, peakq equals one if the tender
has a reference date on the peak quarter (the fourth) and zero otherwise.
Our coefficient of interest is β3 which measures how the difference in the number
of procurement tenders won by contributing firms concerning the non-contributing
changes in the peak quarter. In other words, β3 measures the effect of peak demand
on the return of campaign contributions. β3 has causal interpretation under the or-
thogonality condition
Cov[contributing f · peakq, ε f ,q,y|α f , αq,y] = 0.
Such a condition is restrictive in our setting because it imposes that all time-variant
firm characteristics related to procurement choices are orthogonal to how procurement
outcomes vary across fiscal years and across quarters within the same fiscal year.
We take two main steps to probe the plausibility of our identifying hypothesis.
First, we implement specifications with firm and firm-year fixed effects to exclude
biases from omitted time-variant firm characteristics and firm-specific trends across
years. Second, we estimate specifications with sector-quarter and municipality-quarter
fixed effects to decrease the probability of biases caused by omitted firms’ character-
istics that vary across quarters explain our results. Hence, by checking the stability of
our coefficient across specifications with more restrictive identifying variation, we can
understand whether the remaining biases are from omitted variable bias are plausible
or not.
6 Results
In this section, we proceed in three steps. First, we describe the distribution of the
number of purchase acts in the ComprasNet system across quarters of the fiscal year.
Second, we use the OLS regression model of equation 2 to estimate the return of cam-
13
paign contribution as the number of procurement terms won by contributing firms in
excess to non-contributing ones (in percentage points). Finally, we use the OLS re-
gression model of an equation 3 to measure how the return of campaign contributions
changes at the last quarter of the fiscal year, which is when the number of purchase
acts peaks.
6.1 End-of-the-year spending in Brazil
Figure 1: Number of auctions peak in the last quarter in Brazil
(a) Amount of purchases per quarter (b) Development of purchases over a year
Note: In figure 1 we display descriptive evidence about the distribution of the number of purchase
acts across the quarters using data from the ComprasNet system of the years 2007-2014. In panel (a)
each column represents the yearly average of purchase acts done in that quarter. In panel (b) we
display the average development of purchase acts relative to the first quarter over the other three
quarters. Both panels show evidence for a spike in spending in the final quarter of the fiscal year.
Figure 1 displays descriptive evidence about the number of purchase acts in the
CompresNet system across quarters of the fiscal year. Panel A shows the yearly av-
erage (2007-2014) of the number of purchase acts across the four quarters of the fiscal
year. To see how a counterfactual uniform distribution would look, we plot the yearly
average (2007-2014) of the number of purchase acts per quarter with a red line. To
have a sense of the magnitude of the peak, panel (b) plots the number of purchase
acts across the four quarters of the fiscal year relative to the same variable in the first
quarter - i.e., num tendersqnum tenders1 for q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The resulting graphic patterns show an intense peak at the end of the year. Panel
(a) shows that the fourth quarter hosts, on average, 318.747 thousand purchase acts per
year, which corresponds to 32.5% of the year total and 7.5% more than what we would
expect with purchase acts evenly distributed across quarters. Panel (b) shows that the
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total number of purchase acts in the ComprasNet system is almost three times that
observed in the first quarter. In both panels, we can see that the number of purchase
acts increases monotonically across quarters, suggesting the changes in the costs and
benefits of public purchases caused by expiring budgets are continuous functions of
the distance to the end of the fiscal year.
6.2 Returns of campaign contribution
Table 2 shows the estimates of γ described in equation 2. In column (1), we report the
estimate of γ in the model without fixed effects, which measures the unconditional
difference in outcome means between contributing and non-contributing firms. To
have a sense of whether omitted variables explain such positive difference in means,
in columns (2) to (6), we sequentially add year quarter, 2-digit sector, 5-digit sector,
region, and (headquarter) municipality fixed effects to the specification in column (1).
Table 2: Contributing firms win more procurement tenders than the non-contributing ones -
i.e., there are positive returns of contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of
tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders
Contributing 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.00775) (0.00775) (0.00766) (0.00733) (0.00728) (0.00731)
Observations 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656
R-squared 0.00175 0.00792 0.0393 0.0743 0.0760 0.0959
Year Quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (2-digit) FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (5-digit) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No Yes Yes
Town FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table shows the estimates of the impact of contributing to a political campaign on the log
number of tenders won by a firm in a given year-quarter. We estimate such coefficients by OLS using
year-quarter-firm level data from 2007 to 2014 and the regression model described in equation 2. The
baseline regression in column (1) does not include any fixed effects. In column (2), we add year-quarter
fixed effects to the specification in column (1). Next, in columns (3) and (4), we sequentially include
stricter definitions of sector fixed effects (2-digit and 5-digit classifications). Finally, in columns (5) and
(6), we add sequentially narrower location fixed effects (region and municipality). ( * ), ( ** ) and ( *
) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. We use robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level. We report standard errors between parenthesis.
We find evidence consistent with a large and positive return of campaign contribu-
tions. Overall, our results show that contributing firms win between 11.6% and 13.2%
more public tenders than the non-contributing ones. In column (1), we document that
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that contributing firms win on average 11.6% more procurement tenders than non-
contributing ones. In columns (2) to (5), the magnitudes increase when estimated re-
stricted to comparisons within the same sector and location. Since R2 increases from
nearly zero to 0.1, such a pattern suggest that the remaining unobserved differences
between contributing and non-contributing firms are unlikely to explain all the return
of campaign contributions.
Table 3: Returns of contributions increase at the last quarter of the fiscal year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of
tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders
Contributing X Peak 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗
(0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00349)
Observations 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656
R-squared 0.00355 0.00794 0.0393 0.0744 0.0760 0.0959
Year Quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (2-digit) FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (5-digit) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No Yes Yes
Town FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table shows the estimates of the impact of contributing to a political campaign on the log
number of tenders won by a firm in a given year-quarter across peak and non-peak quarters. We esti-
mate such coefficients by OLS using year-quarter-firm level data from 2007 to 2014 and the regression
model described in equation 2. The baseline regression in column (1) does not include any fixed effects.
In column (2), we add year quarter fixed effects to the specification in column (1). Next, in columns (3)
and (4), we sequentially include stricter definitions of sector fixed effects (2- digit and 5-digit sectors).
Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we add sequentially narrower location fixed effects (region and munic-
ipality). (*), (**) and (*) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. We use robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level. We report standard errors between parenthesis.
6.3 End of the year spending and returns of contributions
In Table 3, we present the estimates of β3 described in equation 3. β3 measures by how
much the returns of campaign contribution increases in the peak quarter concerning
the other quarters of the year (in percentage points). Column (1) shows the estimation
of β3 using a regression model without fixed effects. Next, in columns (2) to (6), we
sequentially add year-quarter, 2-digit sector, 5-digit sector, region, and municipality
fixed effects to the specification in column (1).
Our estimates show that the return of campaign contributions rises in the last quar-
ter of the year by a large magnitude. In columns (1) to (6), we report an increase of
2.65 p.p. in the peak quarter. Compared to β̂1 = .127, the most pronounced estimate
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of the return of contributions in Table 2, β̂3 = .0265 represents an increase of more
than 20% in the return of contributions during the peak quarter. Besides, the fact that
β̂3 remains stable while the R2 increases when we add fixed effects to the regression
model suggests that the remaining omitted variables are unlikely to cause a bias with
the sign and the strength to generate a positive and significant β̂3.
To check whether omitted variable biases explain our estimates, we estimate even
more restrictive specifications in Table 4. Column (1) adds firm fixed effects to the
specification in column (6) of Table 3, which is the specification described in equation
3. Next, in columns (2) to (4), we sequentially add firm-year, (5-digit) sector-quarter
and town-quarter fixed effects to the specification displayed in column (1).
Results in Table 4 corroborate those in 3. In columns (1) and (2), the effect remains
stable despite R2 increasing to around 0.7. Such a pattern confirms that neither time-
invariant firm characteristics nor firm-specific trends across years explain our results.
In columns (3) and (4), the effect increases in comparison to the main estimates of
β̂3 = .0265, suggesting that unobserved firm characteristics varying across quarters
mitigate the effects instead of inflating it. Overall, results in Table 4 suggest that our
partial correlations may be a reasonable approximation for the true causal effect of
expiring budgets on the return of contributions, likely bounding its magnitude from
below.
7 Robustness checks
7.1 Robust peaks at the end of the fiscal year.
Table A.1 in the Appendix A displays the estimates of δk described in the specification
in equation 1. We normalize all coefficients concerning the first quarter, meaning that
we replicate the pattern presented in figure 1 by finding positive and increasing coef-
ficients. To gauge the robustness of the end of the year spikes, in columns (2) to (5), we
sequentially add year, public organization, municipality, and good fixed effects to the
specification in column (1). Estimates in Table A.1 in the Appendix A show positive,
increasing, and statistically significant coefficients in all specifications. Such estimates
corroborate the economic hypothesis that the volume of purchase acts in the Compras-
Net increase across quarters until peaking at the last quarter. As results remain similar
when adding fixed effects, it is unlikely that differential trends in demand for public
goods across years, public organizations, goods, and towns explain our results.
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Table 4: Increase in the return of contributions in the peak quarter is robust to stringent
specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log # Log # Log # Log #
of tenders of tenders of tenders of tenders
Contributing X Peak 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗
(0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00359) (0.00361)
Observations 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656
R-squared 0.505 0.697 0.700 0.702
Year Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (5-digit) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Town FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Sector(5-digit) Quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Town Quarter FE No No No Yes
Note: This table shows the estimates of the impact of contributing to a political campaign
on the log number of tenders won by a firm in a given year-quarter across peak and non-
peak quarters. We estimate such coefficients by OLS using year-quarter-firm level data from
2007 to 2014 and the regression model described in equation 2. In column (1) we add firm
fixed effects to the specifications in 3 in column (6). In column (2), we add firm-year fixed
effects. Next, in columns (3) and (4), we sequentially include (5-digit) sector-quarter and
town-quarter fixed effects. (*) , (**) and (***) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%,
and 1%. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. We report standard errors
between parenthesis.
7.2 Robust returns of contributions.
In Table B.1 in the Appendix B, we report estimates from equation 2 but using a
broader definition of contributing firms. More precisely, we define a firm as a con-
tributing one if it has contributed to a national or local electoral campaign. Since the
ComprasNet is a national procurement system, contributions to local elections are less
likely to influence the allocation of national public spending. Hence, the hypothesis
that contributions buy influence in the allocation of procurement contracts gains trac-
tion if we document positive and significant returns of contributions using a measure
of influence that is a priori less likely to affect our outcome.
The results show that γ is significant has a positive sign but with a smaller magni-
tude than the ones in Table 2. Overall, our results in Table B.1 show that contributing
firms win between 6.2% and 8.7% more public tenders than the non-contributing ones.
In line with the hypothesis that local campaign contributions influence local procure-
ment markets, we document the highest magnitudes with the broader treatment in the
specification with town fixed effects in column (9).
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Next, we whether our results in the intensive margin - i.e., in the number tender won
- also manifest in the extensive margin - i.e., the likelihood of winning a procurement
tender. To do so, in Table B.2 in the Appendix B, we report estimates of the return of
contributions using an indicator variable equaling one when the firm has won at least
one tender as the outcome. Hence, in this case, γ measures the increase in the probabil-
ity of winning at least a procurement tender in a given year received by contributing
firms concerning non-contributing ones. Overall, Table B.2 shows that contributing
firms are between 3.6% to 4.0% more likely of winning a procurement tender than
the non-contributing ones, confirming that positive returns of campaign contributions
manifest both at the intensive and extensive margins.
7.3 Robust effect of the peak quarter on returns of campaign contri-
bution
To probe the generality of our mechanism, in Table C.1 in Appendix C, we report esti-
mates from equation 3 using a broader definition of contributing firms, which entails
contributions to national and local elections. The effect of the peak quarter on the
return of political connection is 1.42 p.p., which correspond to an increase of 16% of
its most pronounced estimates using such treatment definition, which corroborate our
main findings in Table 3.
Next, to verify whether our mechanism also impacts the extensive margin of pro-
curement contracts, in Table C.2 in the Appendix C, we report estimates from equation
3 but using an indicator as dependent variable. The effect of the peak quarter on the
return of political connection is 0.6 p.p. in all specifications, which corresponds to 15%
of its most pronounced estimates using such outcome. Once more, the magnitudes
remain in the ballpark of those in Table 3.
Conclusion
Do fiscal policy regulations affect the degree of political favouritism in the allocation
of public resources? To answer this general question, we investigated whether the
interaction of two customary practices of democracies, namely campaign financing by
corporate contributions and the presence of expiring budgets, affect the allocation of
procurement contracts across firms.
We use Brazil as a laboratory to document three main results that help answer-
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ing such overlooked question. First, we document that procurement activity peaks
in the fourth quarter, which is the first evidence of end-of-the-year spending from a
non-OECD country to our knowledge. Second, we document a positive and signifi-
cant return of campaign contributions, meaning that contributing firms win between
11.6 and 13.4 per cent more procurement tenders than non-contributing ones. Third,
we show that the return of campaign contribution increase in the last quarter in mag-
nitudes between 15.1 to 24.6 per cent of its most pronounced estimate, highlighting
how influential are expiring budgets. This last finding is the first evidence showing
that the budget calendar induces political favouritism, which bridges the consolidated
literature documenting the return of political connections with the nascent research
exploring the consequences of expiring budgets.
This study has three main limitations caused by data and time limitations. First, al-
though robust to very demanding specifications, our estimates are partial correlations.
For instance, by leveraging variation in the intensity of last quarter peaks across years,
we could find a triple difference specification where parallel trends are plausible in
the data.4 Second, we are relatively silent about the mechanism causing the peaks in
the returns to contributions in the last quarter of the fiscal year. For instance, is it the
contractual design, privileged information, bidding behaviour, or ex-post bidding dis-
cretion? Third, we did not show that expiring budgets affect outcomes more directly
connected to welfare, such as corruption, time- and cost-overrun of public contracts.
We leave these issues for the future of this research.
Our findings linking expiring budgets to political favouritism invite more research
investigating the consequences of the impact of fiscal policy institutions on the allo-
cation of public resources. For instance, it is still unknown whether expiring budgets
increase corruption and patronage, two crucial features of the political-economy liter-
ature. We leave such important questions for future investigations.
4In this case, the three differences would be: peak vs non-peak at the quarter level, contributing vs
non-contributing at the firm level, and high peak at the year level.
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Appendix A Robustness checks of the end-of-the-year spending in Brazil
Table A.1: There is evidence that public spending peaks in the final quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log # Log # Log # Log # Log # Log #
of tenders of tenders of tenders of tenders of tenders of tenders
Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Q2 0.00771∗∗∗ 0.00807∗∗∗ 0.00740∗∗∗ 0.00739∗∗∗ 0.00520∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
(0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00130) (0.00129) (0.00125) (0.00115)
Q3 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
(0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00171) (0.00167) (0.00163) (0.00139)
Q4 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗∗
(0.00208) (0.00210) (0.00209) (0.00208) (0.00203) (0.00157)
Observations 7813400 7813400 7813400 7813400 7813400 7813400
R-squared 0.000575 0.000800 0.00367 0.0165 0.0402 0.321
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public Organization (Layer 1) FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public Organization (Layer 2) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Public Organization (Layer 3) FE No No No No Yes Yes
Goods FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table displays estimates of the quarter(s) effect on the log number of tenders in a quarter. We estimate such coefficients
by OLS using quarterly data from 2007 to 2014 and the regression model described in equation 1. The baseline regression in
column (1) does not include any fixed effects. In column (2), we add year fixed effects to the specification in column (1). Next, in
columns (3) to (5), we sequentially include stricter definitions of organization fixed effects (layers 1, 2, and 3). Finally, in column
(6), we include good fixed effects. ( * ), ( ** ) and ( * ) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. We use robust standard
errors clustered at good-level. The standard errors of the coefficients are in the parenthesis.
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Appendix B Robustness checks of returns of contribu-
tions
Table B.1: Returns of contributions are robust to broader definitions of campaign contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of
tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders
Contributing 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗∗ 0.0750∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.0874∗∗∗
(0.00544) (0.00544) (0.00545) (0.00537) (0.00535) (0.00540)
Observations 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656
R-squared 0.000807 0.00698 0.0380 0.0733 0.0751 0.0954
Year Quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (2-digit) FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (5-digit) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No Yes Yes
Town FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table shows the estimates of the impact of contributing to a political campaign on the log
number of tenders won by a firm in a given year-quarter. We estimate such coefficients by OLS using
year-quarter-firm level data from 2007 to 2014 and the regression model described in equation 2. We use
the broader definition of contribution to a political campaign which includes campaign contributions
of firms to national and local elections. The baseline regression in column (1) does not include any fixed
effects. In column (2), we add year quarter fixed effects to the specification in column (1). Next, in
columns (3) and (4), we sequentially include stricter definitions of sector fixed effects ( 2- digit and 5-
digit sectors). Finally, in column (5) and (6), we add sequentially narrower location fixed effects (region,
and municipality). ( * ), ( ** ) and ( * ) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. We use
robust standard errors clustered at firm-level. We report standard errors between parenthesis.
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Table B.2: The probability to win at least one tender is higher for contributing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to
win win win win win win
Contributing 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗∗ 0.0390∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗
(0.00192) (0.00192) (0.00189) (0.00183) (0.00182) (0.00181)
Observations 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656
R-squared 0.00182 0.00834 0.0248 0.0454 0.0469 0.0648
Year Quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (2-digit) FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (5-digit) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No Yes Yes
Town FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table shows the estimates of the impact of contributing to a political campaign on the indica-
tor variable equaling one when the firm has won at least one tender in a given year-quarter. We estimate
such coefficients by OLS using year-quarter-firm level data from 2007 to 2014 and the regression model
described in equation 2. The baseline regression in column (1) does not include any fixed effects. In
column (2), we add year quarter fixed effects to the specification in column (1). Next, in columns (3)
and (4), we sequentially include stricter definitions of sector fixed effects ( 2- digit and 5-digit sectors).
Finally, in column (5) and (6), we add sequentially narrower location fixed effects (region, and munici-
pality). ( * ), ( ** ) and ( * ) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. We use robust standard
errors clustered at firm-level. We report standard errors between parenthesis.
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Appendix C Robustness checks of the increase of returns
of political connections in the peak quarter
Table C.1: The increase in the return of contributions in the peak quarter is robust to broader
definitions of campaign contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of Log # of
tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders tenders
Contributing X Peak 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Observations 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656
R-squared 0.00260 0.00699 0.0380 0.0733 0.0751 0.0954
Year Quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (2-digit) FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (5-digit) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No Yes Yes
Town FE No No No No No Yes
Note:This table shows the estimates of the impact of contributing to a political campaign on the log
number of tenders won by a firm in a given year-quarter. We estimate such coefficients by OLS using
year-quarter-firm level data from 2007 to 2014 and the regression model described in equation 3. We use
the broader definition of contribution to a political campaign which includes campaign contributions
of firms to national and local elections. The baseline regression in column (1) does not include any fixed
effects. In column (2), we add year quarter fixed effects to the specification in column (1). Next, in
columns (3) and (4), we sequentially include stricter definitions of sector fixed effects ( 2- digit and 5-
digit sectors). Finally, in column (5) and (6), we add sequentially narrower location fixed effects (region,
and municipality). ( * ), ( ** ) and ( * ) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. We use
robust standard errors clustered at firm-level. We report standard errors between parenthesis.
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Table C.2: The increase in the probability to win at least one tender in the peak quarter is
robust to stringent specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to Prob. to
win win win win win win
Contributing X 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
Peak (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656 3082656
R-squared 0.00395 0.00834 0.0248 0.0454 0.0469 0.0649
Year Quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (2-digit) FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (5-digit) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No Yes Yes
Town FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table shows the estimates of the impact of contributing to a political campaign on the indica-
tor variable equaling one when the firm has won at least one tender in a given year-quarter. We estimate
such coefficients by OLS using year-quarter-firm level data from 2007 to 2014 and the regression model
described in equation 3. The baseline regression in column (1) does not include any fixed effects. In
column (2), we add year quarter fixed effects to the specification in column (1). ). Next, in columns (3)
and (4), we sequentially include stricter definitions of sector fixed effects (2- digit and 5-digit sectors).
Finally, in column (5) and (6), we sequentially narrower location fixed effects (region and municipality).
( * ), ( ** ) and ( * ) indicate a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. We use robust standard errors
clustered at firm-level. We report standard errors between parenthesis.
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